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ARTICLE
SCREEN CREDIT IN THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY
Robert Davenport t
Screen credit is probably the single most important factor for artists
in the entertainment business. This factor determines who is "hot" and
who is not; it is the basis for determining whether artists are offered sub-
sequent assignments and their increase in compensation for those
assignments.
[B]ig box office names are built, in part, through being promi-
nently featured in popular films and by receiving appropriate
recognition in film credits and advertising. Since actors' fees
for pictures and indeed, their ability to get work at all, is often
based on the drawing power their name may be expected to
have at the box office, being accurately credited for films in
which they have played [is] .. .of critical importance .... I
The focus here is the right of paternity for artists, which naturally
includes within it the right of an artist to be accorded proper screen
credit. The Berne Convention2 ("Berne"), a century old treaty, guaran-
tees the right of paternity to all artists and provides a definition of pater-
nity which guarantees a broad right to claim authorship or credit:
[I]ndependently of the author's economic rights and even after
the transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.'
An additional provision of the Berne Convention "encompasses the au-
thor's rights to have the work published anonymously or pseudony-
" A.B. Middlebury College, J.D. St. John's Law School, M.B.A. Harvard Business
School
1. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. The Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at Berne,
Switzerland on September 8, 1886, [hereinafter "Berne Convention"].
3. Berne Convention, supra note 2, at Article 6bis.
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mously, to prevent it from being attributed to another and to prevent his
name from being applied to the work of another person.4
Historically, the American position on artist credit has been in di-
rect opposition to that adopted by the majority of countries who signed
the Berne Convention.' The fundamental "moral right" of paternity was
a major stumbling block to American ratification of the treaty, primarily
because "American copyright law.., does not recognize moral rights or
provide for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic,
rather than personal, rights of authors."6 The Convention's goal, on the
other hand, was to provide this personal moral right to artists.
The entrenched American view of moral rights is clearly seen in the
case of Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.7 ("Vargas"). The artist, Vargas, at-
tempted to exercise his moral rights after signing an agreement with a
publisher to reprint his art for a calender.8 The contract explicitly stated
that Vargas' work could be reproduced without his name.9 Vargas ar-
gued that reprinting his art without attributing credit to him constituted
a misrepresentation and was unfair competition.'0 The Vargas court
stated:
[t]he conception of 'moral rights' of authors so fully recognized
and developed in the civil law countries has not yet received
acceptance in the law of the United States. No such right is
referred to by legislation, court decision or writers. What
plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to
conform to certain other countries. We need not stop to in-
quire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the
legislative or judicial branch of the government, in any event,
4. World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), Guide to the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 41, n.5 (Paris Act 1971) (noted in Final
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention-Moral
Rights, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 550 (1986)).
5. Berne Convention, supra note 2.
6. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
7. 164 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1947). See also Chesler v. Avon Book Div., 76 Misc. 2d
1048, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552, 557 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (An author was unsuccessful in preventing a
publisher from condensing his hardcover book for a paperback edition). "The authorities she
cites do not establish that [the doctrine of moral right] ... is recognized in New York." Id. at
1051, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555. Of course, even Berne does not prevent a subsequent owner of
an artistic work from totally destroying it, thus removing the creation to which credit would
attach. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 573, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818
(1949) (An artist was unsuccessful in preventing a church from destroying the wall on which
he had painted a fresco).
8. Vargas, 164 F.2d at 524.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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we are not disposed to make any new law in this respect."
Though the United States has recently become a signatory to the
Convention,' 2 Congress has declined to implement into federal law those
provisions of Berne which guarantee the broad right of paternity.13 Be-
cause Congress merely implemented Berne but did not statutorily enact
it, it is clear that Congress did not intend to automatically increase or
decrease the moral rights available to artists under current case law.14
Though the full impact of the Berne Convention has not been felt in the
United States,'" congressional ratification of the treaty has opened the
doors for the courts to further expand the right of credit in the United
States. Courts are now recognizing the rights of artists to be associated
with their work. It is the argument of this author that artists' rights have
evolved from a "caveat emptor" approach,'6 where the contract ruled
and the right of credit was easily bargained away, 17 to a growing realiza-
11. Id. at 526.
12. CONG. REC. S14622 (daily ed. Oct. 5,1988) (Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988).
13. Id. "The Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at
Berne, Switzerland on September 8, 1886, and all acts, protocols, and revisions thereto are not
self-executing under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id. at § 2(1). "The
obligations of the United States under the Berne Convention may be performed only pursuant
to appropriate. domestic law." Id. at § 2(2).
14. Supra note 12, at § 3. Construction of the Berne Convention:
(a) Relationship with Domestic Law. The provisions of the Berne Convention -
(1) shall be given effect under Title 17, as amended by this Act, and any other
relevant provision of Federal or State law, including the common law; and
(2) shall not be enforceable in any action brought pursuant to the provisions of the
Berne Convention itself.
(b) Certain Rights Not Affected. - The provisions of the Berne Convention, the
adherence of the United States hereto, and satisfaction of United States obligations
thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether
claimed under Federal, State, or the common law -
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author's honor or
reputation.
Id.
15. Supra note 12.
No right or interest in a work eligible for protection under this title may be claimed
by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the
adherence of the United States thereto. Any rights in a work eligible for protection
under this title that derive from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or the
common law, shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the
provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.
Id.
16. In this case, let the artist beware that his "bundle of rights" has not been reduced to
one stick. Giving the Devil Its Due: Actors' and Performers' Right to Receive Attribution for
Cinematic Roles, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J., 299, 309 (1985).
17. Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). "It
seems to me that the plaintiff transferred all rights in her work to the defendant by express
1990]
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tion that an artist's right of paternity, and hence right to screen credit, is
an inalienable right. Congressional adoption of Berne and the evolution
of judge-made law has resulted in a right to screen credit that approxi-
mates the paternity right defined in Berne. However, instead of being a
neatly defined term as found in Berne, the judicially-created right to
credit in the United States is a patchwork of rights from which an entitle-
ment can be fashioned.' 8 During the congressional debate concerning
whether the United States should become a signatory to the Convention,
it was stated: "there are substantial grounds for concluding that the to-
tality of the U.S. law provides protection for the right of paternity
.... "19 Thus, even without statutory enactment of Berne, there are legal
theories on which paternity rights can be based.2"
contract and she cannot complain at this time that defendant did not mention her ... in the
screen credits ...." Id. at 121.
Perhaps the most egregious early case was that of Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522
(7th Cir. 1947), which demonstrates the lengths the courts will go to strip authorship com-
pletely from one who has not guarded himself with a phalanx of attorneys. Vargas had created
a series of famous renditions for Esquire Magazine which were originally titled the "Vargas
Girl." Later, the publisher reprinted the drawings without Vargas' name. The court stated
that Esquire could remove Vargas' name from his artwork and substitute a name of their own,
because it had purchased the complete right to the pictures.
Plaintiff argues that the use of 'Esquire Girl' as a title for the pictures was a represen-
tation that the author was someone other than the plaintiff. We do not agree with
this contention.... [A]s already shown, it was provided in the contract that both the
pictures and name 'shall forever belong exclusively to Esquire'.. . . [T]his was the
basis both upon which plaintiff was paid and upon which Esquire acquired their
possession and ownership.
Id. at 527.
18. Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Whether or not there is any square counterpart in American law of the 'moral right'
of artists assertedly recognized on the European continent, there is enough in plain-
tiff's allegations to suggest that he may yet be able to prove a charge of unfair compe-
tition or otherwise tortious misbehavior in the distribution to the public of a film that
bears his name but at the same time severely garbles, distorts or mutilates his work.
It is at least arguable that there is a claim under the Lanham Act... [iun the charge
that defendant represents to the public that what the plaintiff had nothing to do with
is the plaintiff's product.... Perhaps a similar species of wrong is defined and reach-
able under the law of New York and other jurisdictions where the film is being
shown.
Id. at 278.
19. 133 CONG. REC. S7370 (daily ed. May 29, 1987) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
20. Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The doctrine of moral right recognized by the civil law of many European and Latin
American countries.., even after the transfer of the copyright in his work... (Berne
Convention, article 6bis) ... is not part of the law in the United States, except in so
far as parts of that doctrine exist in our law as specific rights - such as copyright,
libel, privacy and unfair competition.
Id. at 340, n.5.
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I. A COMPILATION OF LEGAL THEORIES FOR PATERNITY RIGHTS
A. The Copyright Act
The 1976 Copyright Act protects a written work for the life of the
author plus fifty years. 2 One policy behind this time period is to make it
easier for third parties to compute the period of protection.22 At least
one commentator has suggested that this provides a legal theory on
which to base an author's right to credit.23
When an author writes and sells a screenplay,2" the copyright to the
screenplay terminates fifty years after the author's death, at which point
any member of the public has the right to produce a film based upon it.
Failure to identify the author in the credits frustrates attempts by third
parties to determine the date of the unknown author's demise, and thus
the date of the screenplay's expiration of copyright.
It can thus be argued that an express provision in a contract permit-
ting the producer to omit the author's name is unenforceable because it
violates the policy underlying the 1976 Copyright Act. Although this
approach has not yet been formally adopted in any case law, it appears to
be firmly rooted in the intent of the statute.
B. The Lanham Act
Since the dark days of Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.,25 courts have increas-
ingly accepted the concept of the moral right to screen credit.26 The
Lanham Act,2 7 the federal unfair competition law, is perhaps the most
21. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 135, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5751.
23. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Conven-
tion - "Moral Rights." 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 522 n.19 (1986).
24. This theory would not help a writer who has written a screenplay as a work made for
hire, rather than to have written it and then to have sold it as his or her own work. As a work
made for hire, the writer's employer, usually the producer, is considered the author for pur-
poses of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1986) states: "in the case of a work made
for hire, the employer.., for whom the work was prepared is considered the author ... unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them."
25. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
26. In the past, the studios had 'morals' clauses in their artist contracts, which could be
used to deny screen credit to those who engaged in immoral behavior, which was expanded
during the McCarthy era to include allegations of communism. For an excellent review of the
"morals clause" see Berman & Rosenthal, Screen Credit and the Law, 9 UCLA L. REV. 156,
169-77, (1962). This subject is not dealt with in my law journal article because all guild agree-
ments now prohibit the inclusion of such clauses, and all entertainment lawyers ensure that
their clients do not have such clauses in their contracts, so that as a practical matter the whole
issue has, hopefully, become moot.
27. Lanham Act, § 43(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1982): "Any person who shall affix ... a
1990]
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effective sword utilized in support of an artist's right to screen credit.28
"One well known treatise . . . suggested that any author may claim a
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act if his work is published
without his name." 29
The Act effectively contains two causes of action. One cause arises
when credit to which the artist is entitled is deleted ("implied reverse
passing off"),3" and the other cause arises when work belonging to one
artist is attributed to another ("express reverse passing off").3" An ex-
ample of the coexistence of both causes of action is seen in Smith v.
Mon toro. 32 There, "defendants not only removed appellant's name from
all credits and advertising, they also substituted a name of their own
choosing."33
A typical trademark infringment case under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act requires that there be a trademark, which is registered,
along with a showing of market competition.34 These legal requisites are
not required in credit cases. In a credit case, the plaintiff need not prove
that a trademark exists,35 that it is registered,36 or that there is market
false designation of origin... and shall cause such goods to enter into commerce... shall be
liable in a civil action ... by any person who believes he... is likely to be damaged by the use
of ... such false ... representation."
28. But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976). In a
concurring opinion, Judge Gurfein rejects the concept of relief for screen credit under the
Lanham Act, but no case has ever followed his lead, Id. at 26.
29. Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-85 (W.D. Ark.
1987). The commentator being referred to is M. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21
(e) (1987).
Removing credit "amounts to express reverse passing off... [S]uch conduct ... is
wrongful, because it involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's
talents and workmanship. Moreover ... the originator of the misidentified product
is involuntarily deprived of its name and of the goodwill that otherwise would stem
from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfactory product.... [An action
for removing credit states] a valid claim for relief under 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Smith, 648 F.2d at 607.
30. Supra note 29.
31. In a third cause of action the artist is forced to seek removal of his credit from the
work, either because he had no connection with the work, or because it misrepresents his
efforts. The Lanham Act supports this action, since the improper attribution of credit is still a
fraud on the public.
32. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. The concept applies not only to performers, but equally to all artists, including
producers, directors and authors. Id. at 607. See also Dodd, 666 F. Supp. at 1278. A teacher
and her students wrote a book, which was subsequently given to another writer who made
some revisions and then published the book as sole author. No mention was made on the title
page of the teacher or her students. Id. at 1284.
34. Dodd, 666 F. Supp. at 1284.
35. Id. Accord, Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 213 U.S.P.Q. 96, 102 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd in
part, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
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competition. Additionally, the plaintiff is not required to prove con-
sumer confusion typically required under the Lanham Act,37 because
screen credit cases are considered sui generis. In screen credit cases, the
confusion is not caused by a comparison of two competing products la-
belled with the same name and both in the public domain, but rather is
the result of the omission or misidentification of the name of the artist
responsible for its creation." Absent any express contract language,39
authors have the right to use their own name on their creations.' Au-
thors can bargain away this right of paternity,4' but this right is expressly
reserved unless explicitly conveyed.42 It is no defense to a violation
under the Lanham Act to state that some of the joint authors to a project
were given the appropriate credit.43 "An incomplete designation of the
source of the good or service is no less misleading because it is partially
correct."'
Two benefits result from using the Lanham Act theory. First, fed-
eral court jurisdiction is available without a showing of diversity between
the parties. Second, once entitlement to protection is established under
the Lanham Act, remedies exist both for specific performance of credit
36. National Lampoon v. American Broadcasting Co., 376 F. Supp. 733, 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), affd per curiam, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974). Cher 213 U.S.P.Q. 96.
37. PPX Enter. v. Audio Fidelity Enter., 818 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1987).
If the statement actually is false, relief can be granted on the court's own findings
without reference to the reaction of the buyer or consumer of the product .... This
is the same conclusion implicitly reached in several cases involving counterfeit Louis
Vuitton products, in which plaintiffs appear to have established entitlement to dam-
ages absent an evidentiary showing of actual consumer confusion or deception.
Id.
38. Dodd, 666 F. Supp. at 1285.
39. Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enter., 160 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958). "Courts will
protect against: (a) the omission of the author's name, unless, by contract, the right is given to
the publisher to do so .... Id.
40. Chesler v. Avon Books Div., 76 Misc. 2d 1048, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
"The purchaser cannot... put it out under another name than the author's, nor can he omit
altogether the name of the author, unless his contract with the latter permits him to do so."
Id. at 1052, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
41. Harlequin Enter. v. Warner Books, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (An au-
thor's previous publisher sought to enjoin him from using his own name on new books).
42. Id. at 1090. "Since [the contract] permits [the author] to write other books, and does
not restrict him from designating himself as author, he is well within his rights in accepting a
byline ...." Id.
43. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1988) (Two com-
posers re-released their songs and omitted the names of two of their collaborators from ac-
knowledgment or credit).
44. Id. at 1408. See also Kingsmen v. K-Tel Int'l, 557 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(Court enjoined the original lead singer of the Kingsmen from releasing his own recording of
"Louie, Louie" as by the Kingsmen, when the rest of the group did not join in the recording).
1990]
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by injunction and for damages for past loss of credit for which injunctive
relief is no longer available.
1. Lanham Act Jurisdiction
Until recently, the question of jurisdiction in Lanham Act cases was
not an issue, since trademark actions lie properly in federal court,45 and
pendent jurisdiction bootstraps related causes of action into district
court. Once properly in federal court, if "jurisdiction was premised on
the Lanham Act, ... [plaintiff has] proved a cause of action for breach of
contract which the court [can] . . .adjudicate on the basis of pendent
jurisdiction."46 This situation was temporarily upset when a federal
court denied jurisdiction because a contract was involved in a Lanham
Act case.47 The court reasoned that once classified as a contract action,
federal jurisdiction was undercut.48
When subsequent cases weaved a tortured web to uphold jurisdic-
tion,49 a district court finally formulated a concise rule for jurisdiction
under the Lanham Act." The court rejected the concept that jurisdic-
tion is defeated simply by the presence of an issue of contract law. 1 The
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ... trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall
[not] be exclusive of the courts of the states in [trademarks]." Id.
46. Nuchtern v. Vanderbes, Case 82 Civ. 6182 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) noted in 4 ENT. L. REP. 23
at 2-3 (Aug. 1983).
47. Bear Creek Prod. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
48. Id. But see Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). In a brief footnote, the
court in Bear Creek offhandedly dismissed Smith, the leading case upholding pendent jurisdic-
tion over breach of contract claims without considering whether the content of those claims
undercut § 1338 jurisdiction. Id. at 494 n.23. The Bear Creek court stated:
[p]laintiffs have chosen to rely on the contract in seeking relief. They have set forth
no reason upon which it can fairly be argued that the contract will not be dispositive
of the parties rights and obligations, and they have cited no § 43(a) cases in which
jurisdiction was upheld under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 despite a related claim for breach of
contract. Plaintiffs' cases either involved contracts containing no provision regarding
credit for the allegedly mislabeled product ... or did not consider whether the con-
tract at issue might preclude consideration of the Lanham Act and thus defeat juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 .... Plaintiffs have thus failed to show that their
claim "arises under" the trademark laws within the meaning of § 1338.
Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
49. CBS Catalogue Partnership v. CBS/FOX Co., 668 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). On
a motion to dismiss, the district court upheld jurisdiction over a copyright infringement claim
despite assertions that the action was really one for breach of contract. It rejected two conten-
tions for dismissal, the first being that "there is no copyright jurisdiction if contract allegations
defeat the copyright claim on the face of the complaint," and the second being that a "case
does not arise under the federal copyright laws because 'the only issues to be resolved are
wholly contractual in nature.' " Id. at 283, 284 (quoting Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F.
Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
50. Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., 686 F. Supp. 86, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
51. Id. at 89-90.
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court logically observed that state law questions, including ownership,
will invariably arise at the beginning of a case, but this should not lead
the court to deny jurisdiction without considering the trademark law is-
sue.52 The court rejected the concept advanced by defendant that "the
court should look behind the complaint to assess whether the action
turns primarily on claims of breach of contract."53 Interestingly, the
court approved the strategy of bringing a parallel action in the state court
to enforce breach of contract claims.54 One important benefit of the Lan-
ham Act is that it grants federal question jurisdiction totally apart from
federal diversity jurisdiction and allows the use of pendent jurisdiction."
C. Remedies
1. Specific Performance
The federal courts have long recognized56 that specific performance
52. Id.
53. Id. at 90-91.
Taking the allegations of the complaint as pleaded, I find that plaintiff 'has directed
his pleading against the offending use ... .' Workshop has pleaded that the defend-
ants have infringed his trademarks and has not asserted a claim for breach of con-
tract. Although this court may be required to make a preliminary determination that
the rights to the trademarks have reverted to plaintiff under the licence agreement,
the necessity for that determination does not defeat federal jurisdiction.
Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 89.
[T]his case comes within the terms of federal subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 1338. The theory of the complaint is not the enforcement of contract rights to
reversion and royalty payments. Rather, the complaint alleges claims under the
Lanham Act. Although [plaintiff] ... has apparently instituted parallel state adjudi-
cation seeking damages from the breach of the licensing agreements, it has directed
this pleading against the offending use. The relief the complaint seeks includes a
declaration that ... the defendants have infringed the trademarks, an injunction
against future infringement, and treble damages, remedies expressly granted by the
Lanham Act.
Id.
55. Smith, 648 F.2d at 608. "In addition to the claim under 43(a), appellant's complaint
alleged claims under state law for breach of contract, 'false light publicity,' and commercial
appropriation of a person's likeness under Cal. Civ. Code § 3344. Since we are reversing dis-
missal of appellant's Lanham Act claim, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of appellant's
state law claims is also reversed. 'One important benefit of 43(a) is that it grants federal ques-
tion jurisdiction totally apart from federal diversity jurisdiction'. . . .Thus, once in federal
court under 43(a), a plaintiff can allege related claims of unfair competition under common
law and any available state statutory provisions." Id. (quoting 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.1 (1973)).
56. Universal Pictures v. Aumont, No. 7193-O'C (S.D. Cal. 1947), quoted in Berman &
Rosenthal, Screen Credit and the Law, 9 UCLA L. REV. 156, 179 n.84 (1962).
[Tihis is a proper case for granting a Temporary Restraining Order in that credit and
billing to an actress in the motion picture industry is of extreme and vital importance
and that advertising and paid publicity material issued, released, publicized or pub-
lished, wherein an actress does not receive the credit to which she is entitled by
1990]
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is the choice remedy for loss of credit under the Lanham Act.
[T]he failure to give... [screen] credit would constitute irrepa-
rable injury. Not only would money damages be difficult to
establish, but at best they would hardly compensate for the real
injury done. A[n] [artist's] . . .reputation, which would be
greatly enhanced by public credit for authorship of an out-
standing picture, is his stock in trade and it is clear that irrepa-
rable injury would follow the failure to give him screen credit if
in fact he is entitled to it.
5 7
Since "damages are difficult to prove and the harm to the plaintiff's repu-
tation . . . is irreparable, injunctive relief is appropriate.""8 Unfortu-
nately, some courts have not understood the dynamics of the
entertainment business, declaring that a damage remedy was sufficient,
since "screen credits have little or no significance and any resulting harm
by failure to include [the] name in the credits will be minimal.
59
A more sensible approach was taken by the court in National
Lampoon v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc."° ("National Lam-
poon"). In National Lampoon, the publisher of the satirical magazine
"National Lampoon" brought suit to enjoin ABC from using the word
"Lampoon" in its title for a pilot television program of humor and en-
tertainment.6" The court enjoined ABC from using "Lampoon, ' 62 stat-
reason of her status in the industry and agreements therefore can and will as a proxi-
mate result thereof cause said motion picture actress to suffer great and irreparable
damage and harm to her reputation and standing both personally and as a motion
picture actress in the eyes of the motion picture industry and the public generally
Id. at 179 n.84.
57. Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
58. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Uhlaender v. Henricksen,
316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970). In Uhlaender the court found damages inadequate
stating:
[ilt seems clear to the court that a celebrity's property interest in his name and like-
ness is unique, and therefore there is no serious question as to the propriety of injunc-
tive relief. Defendants have violated plaintiff's rights by the unauthorized
appropriation of their names and statistics for commercial use. The remedy at law,
considering particularly the difficulty in determining and measuring damages, past or
future, is inadequate.
316 F. Supp. at 1283.
59. Luster Enter. v. Jacobs, 78 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). "If a screen credit is
improperly denied her by the defendants she has an action in damages. One of the forgotten
functions of the damage remedy is to apprise members of the community of the rights which
the court has adjudicated in the plaintiffs' favor. If the plaintiffs prevail in this action the
attendant publicity and the subsequent damage award will make .. .[plaintiff] whole within
her professional community." Id. at 75.
60. National Lampoon v. American Broadcasting Co., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
61. Id. at 736.
62. Id. at 750.
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ing that "money damages are inadequate. The law recognizes that the
consequences of trademark infringement, or passing off and unfair com-
petition generally, are by their nature not fully compensable by money
damages.''63 Having established the right to enjoin a property before
production, the court then extended the equitable remedy to those situa-
tions where plaintiff sought to prevent release of the television program
after completion."
2. Preliminary Injunction
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is regarded by the courts as
an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the movant
demonstrates:
(1) a threat of irreparable harm, (2) that the state of balance
between the harm likely to be suffered by the movant and the
injury the injunction will inflict on other parties favors the mo-
vant, (3) a probability that the movant will succeed on the mer-
its and (4) that the public interest favors the granting of the
injunction.65
In credit cases, irreparable harm is presumed and therefore exists as a
matter of law.6 6 The presumption arises because proof of a likelihood of
confusion satisfies the requirement of irreparable harm,6 7 and a likeli-
hood of confusion is inferred.68 The presumption is created by combin-
ing several rules of law. One rule of law states that if the plaintiff
63. Id. The court was under no illusions as to the nature of National Lampoon when it
remarked
[e]ven if we assume defendants' program will be funnier, or better, or more accepta-
ble in regard to its conformity with general public standards of taste, than a television
series which plaintiff [National Lampoon] produced, nonetheless irreparable injury is
present. . . .Trash though it may be, plaintiff's magazine does have a consistent
'product quality' as do its other products ....
Id. at 749-50.
64. Nuchtern v. Vanderbes, Case 82 Civ. 6182 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), noted in 4 Ent. L. Rep.
24, at 2-3 (May 1983). The producer tried to list himself as co-director of the film. "The court
found that Nuchtern had not agreed to Vanderbes' proposal to a shared or different credit on
the film[,] and that there was substantial evidence to establish Nuchtern's contribution as the
sole director of... [the film]. [H]aving shown irreparable harm and loss to his reputation if he
failed to receive director credit, was awarded a preliminary injunction." Id. at 3.
65. Dodd, 666 F. Supp. at 1285.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
The confusion here is not caused by a comparison of two products both in the public
domain. Here the 'confusion' is the result of the alleged false representation of...
[the credited author] as the preparer and editor of the work in question. Undoubt-
edly, the public would have no reason to doubt or question the statement in the book
that ... [the credited author] was responsible for these activities. [The credited au-
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ultimately succeeds on the merits, but was unable to obtain an injunc-
tion, he would have suffered irreparable harm.6 9 Another rule of law
holds that "if plaintiff carries its burden of establishing a likelihood of
confusion, it will have satisfied both the element of possible irreparable
harm and the element of probable success on the merits."" ° Since the
court can infer confusion,7" irreparable harm exists as a matter of law if
the plaintiff can establish his or her right to the credit.
An injunction to enforce screen credit is an equitable remedy which
the plaintiff can jeopardize, either by waiting too long after the com-
mencement of the lawsuit before seeking his or her injunction,72 or by
knowingly allowing the picture to be released without previously seeking
an injunction.7 3 However, if the plaintiff fails to ask for an injunction
early in the action, he or she can still preserve his or her later right to
equitable relief by giving the defendant notice.74
thor] would be receiving credit or at least part of the credit rightfully belonging to
others.
Id.
69. Camp Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Camp Central Park, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 783 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aft'd, 697 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1982).
[I]n Lanham Act cases, '[t]here is no question that irreparable harm would result
from a failure to enjoin if the plaintiff ultimately succeeds on the merits.' This con-
clusion stems from the nature of the rights protected by the Lanham Act, and the
recognition that consequences of trademark infringement and unfair competition 'are
by their nature not fully compensable by money damages.'
Id. at 785 n.12 (quoting Cuisinarts Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1036, 1044-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
70. Camp Beverly Hills, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 785 (emphasis omitted).
71. See supra note 68.
72. Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc. 330 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
[Tlhe plaintiff has not been notably prompt in the assertion of his rights. While he
saw the allegedly distorted film in December and brought his action then, he waited
until February to move for injunctive relief... the court must ... weigh the develop-
ing equities that have continued to grow on the side of the defendant.... [T]he court
is compelled to conclude that the potential injury against which the plaintiff seeks
protection is far outweighed by the clear and substantial hurt defendants would suffer
from the issuance now of a preliminary injunction.
Id.
73. Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). "The plaintiff...
writer ... [sought] a preliminary injunction to enjoin the exhibition of a motion picture enti-
tled Around the World in Eighty Days ... unless the defendants give him screenplay writing
credit." Id. Plaintiff was denied relief on the grounds he knew about the screen credit prob-
lem, yet delayed filing his motion for an injunction until three months after the picture was
released, and was left only with his action for damages. Id.
74. National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 750. When "all [the] time and money invested by
defendants occurred with notice of plaintiff's rights, after plaintiff's demand letter .... " the
court ordered the injunction. Id.
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3. Damages
Under the Lanham Act, if the court cannot award specific perform-
ance, a plaintiff can obtain damages for both past and future denial of
credit."' The cases in this area were initially based on an incorrect judi-
cial presumption that the loss of credit had no pecuniary value. Today
there is acknowledgment that screen credit alone has monetary value. 6
4. Entertainment Guild Remedies
Various artists guilds ("Guilds"), representing writers,7 directors,7"
and actors79 have negotiated with major studios, networks and other sig-
natories to their union agreements to insure that Guild members have a
right to receive screen credit for all projects in which Guild members
have been involved. This right emerged from collective bargaining ses-
sions, and as a result all the Guilds have similar provisions in their basic
Guild agreements providing for screen credit."0 In addition to establish-
ing an artist's general right to credit, the union agreements also specify
the exact wording required for the credit, and in the case of multiple
parties entitled to the same credit, the order and type of credit applicable
to each artist. The Directors Guild of America ("DGA") has gone to the
extreme of insuring that no other guild in the industry can have a credit
sounding similar to "Director."'" A provision in the DGA's basic agree-
ment prohibits members of any other union from being awarded any
75. Paramount Prod., Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 749 (1937).
76. Id.
77. Id. Writers Guild of America ("WGA"), Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement
of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988. "Credit shall be given on the screen for the screenplay author-
ship of feature length photoplays" (Features Schedule A), and "Credit shall be given on the
screen for the authorship of stories and teleplays." (Television Schedule A). Id.
78. Directors Guild of America, Inc. ("DGA"), Basic Agreement of 1987, § 8-201:
The Director of the film shall be accorded credit on all positive prints and all vide-
odiscs/videocassettes of the film.... No other credit shall appear on the card which
accords credit to the Director of the film. Such credit shall be on the last title card
appearing prior to principal photography.
Id.
79. For example, the Screen Actors Guild mandates that every member of its union who
appears in a film will receive at least one credit in the main titles. 1977 Screen Actors Guild
("SAG") Television Agreement 51, § 54; Screen Credit and Billing (a) (1); and 1977 SAG
Theatrical Agreement 31, § 25. Screen Credits, provide that "a cast of characters on at least
one card shall be placed at the end of each television motion picture [theatrical feature] naming
the actor and the role portrayed."
80. See generally, Berman & Rosenthal, Screen Credit and The Law, 9 UCLA L. REV. 156
(1962).
81. DGA Basic Agreement of 1984, § 8-103(a).
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credit which even remotely sounds like that of a "Director."82
The Guilds not only insure their members receive the proper screen
credit in the first instance, but they also insure that screen credit, once
awarded, will never be removed from the print.83 Even if the production
is later assigned to a distribution company, licensed into television syndi-
cation, released on cable, or sold outright to the public on video cassette,
the Guilds have incorporated safeguards into their agreements which
mandate the attachment of the credit to the released copy, and which
contractually binds the new owner to retain the credit in all subsequent
uses of the title.84
D Federal Preemption
With the adoption of the Berne Treaty, Congress had the option to
pass legislation specifically granting paternity rights to authors, and thus
preempt state law. However, since the federal legislature failed to act in
this area, the states are free to pass their own legislation guaranteeing the
paternity rights of artists in their works.85 The framers of the Berne-
implementing legislation made it clear that "[t]he scope of Federal pre-
emption under this section is not affected by the adherence of the United
States to the Berne Convention."86
82. Id.
The Employer will not hereafter ... enter into any agreement with any [other] guild
... where it agrees to accord members thereof credit on screen... which includes the
word "Director" or "Direction," or any derivation thereof•... The Directors Guild
has used this provision to prevent the term "Casting Director" from being credited to
any person on any film or television show under their jurisdiction, although this
provision was instituted too late to prevent the creation of the credit for "Director of
Photography."
Id.
83. WGA Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988.
(Theatrical Schedule A at 252), and the almost identical provision in 1977 SAG Television
Agreement 51, § 54, Screen Credit and Billing (b) (1): "In its distribution and licensing agree-
ments with exhibitors, distributors, broadcasters, etc., Producer will include a provision
prohibiting the licensee from eliminating or changing the billing as it appears on the positive
prints of the motion picture."
84. DGA Basic Agreement of 1987 § 8-307, Assumption of Obligations: "Employer shall
specifically contract with its distributors and the television networks that they shall not cut,
edit, move or omit the credit of the Director as placed by the Employer on the positive prints."
Id.
85. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983
(1980). "The crucial inquiry is not whether state law reaches matters also subject to federal
regulation, but whether the two laws function harmoniously rather than discordantly." Id. at
978. Since federal copyright law does not encompass the issue of moral rights, it does not seem
to preempt state moral rights legislation.
86. Section 301 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: (e): Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act of 1988. Preemption with Respect to Other Laws Not Affected.
CONG. REC. S14622 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988).
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California and New York have enacted modern statutes that estab-
lish a paternity right for works of fine art.87 However, the legislatures
have not expanded the rights granted in those statutes to the screen
trade.8" For example, California specifically grants to the artist, in those
cases where the state purchases a work of art, the "right to claim author-
ship of the work of art"89 "or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim au-
thorship of his . . . work of fine art." 90 To protect those rights, the
California statute authorizes injunctive relief, actual and punitive dam-
ages and attorneys and expert witness fees.9 New York has adopted
identical statutes. 92 While these statutes do not grant rights for screen
credit presently, the mere existence of the statutes holds out hope of fu-
ture guarantees of statutory protection for the right to paternity at the
state level. Nevertheless, there is protection for artists under a wide vari-
ety of other state laws.
II. A COMPILATION OF AVAILABLE LEGAL THEORIES FOR
PATERNITY RIGHTS: RIGHT To CREDIT
UNDER STATE LAW
A. Unfair Competition
1. California
California's recognition of the concept of a misleading credit as un-
fair competition predates modem enactments.93 As early as the days of
Charlie Chaplin's silent films, the courts recognized that
[p]laintiff has the right to be protected against unfair competi-
tion in business. . . . The foregoing principles of law do not
apply alone to the protection of parties having trademarks and
trade names. They reach way beyond that and apply to all
cases where fraud is practiced by one in securing the trade of a
rival dealer and these ways are as many and as various as the
87. See Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir.
1988). "Independent of Reid's ownership of the copyright, CCNV might be obliged to credit
Reid as an author of the sculpture." Id. at 1498.
88. Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, J.
COPYRIGHT Soc. OF THE USA, 196, 196-209, April 1988.
89. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1983).
90. Id.
91. Id. at § 987(e).
92. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW, § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1988). "[T]he artist shall
retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim
authorship of his ... work of fine art." Id.
93. Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 276 P. 544 (1928).
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ingenuity of the dishonest schemer can invent.94
Once denial of credit is established, the California plaintiff can use
the unfair competition statute, which mirrors the federal Lanham Act,95
and which specifically provides for injunction. 96 The federal courts first
recognized that the state statute, California Business and Professions
Code Section 17203, 97 was directly parallel to the federal statute and in-
voked it in California federal cases.98 One drawback to section 17203 is
that the plaintiff's remedy is limited to injunctive relief, unless grounded
in a claim other than unfair competition.99 However, a parallel section
permits the award of monetary damages."° Because "pecuniary com-
94. Id. The court was
perpetually enjoining and restraining [defendants] ... from using the name 'Charles
Aplin' or 'Charlie Aplin,' or any other name similar to that of plaintiff [Charlie
Chaplin] in connection with ... any motion picture, in imitation of the motion pic-
tures of plaintiff, which will be likely to deceive the public into believing that plaintiff
is acting the role therein hereafter referred to ....
Id. at 359, 276 P. at 545.
95. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). Unfair Competition:
[U]nfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising .... " Id.
96. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair competition within
this state may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may
make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to prevent the use or em-
ployment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition ... or
as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real
or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.
Id.
97. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
98. Meta-Film Assoc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
In light of the expansive construction given statutory unfair competition by the Cali-
fornia courts, the court has concluded that the defendants' alleged failure to provide
plaintiff with a screen credit for having written portions of Animal House states a
claim under Business and Professions Code § 17203. In reaching this conclusion, the
court is guided by this Circuit's decision in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1981), a case construing § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Id. at 1362.
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon the common law of unfair competi-
tion to assist in its construction of the Lanham Act .... As in Smith, the plaintiff
alleges that the defendants deprived it of a valuable screen credit and that their ac-
tion involves an attempt to misappropriate another's talents and workmanship. The
court believes that such a practice, which the Ninth Circuit found "unfair," is also
"wrongful" and therefore is proscribed by § 17203.
Id. at 1363.
99. Supra note 97.
100. Meta-Film Assoc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
[In] certain circumstances, courts may award monetary relief in statutory unfair
competition actions; under Business and Professions Code § 17535, the section paral-
lel to § 17203, "the trial court has authority to order restitution as a form of ancillary
relief in... an injunctive action .... [The court may do so if it] determines that such
a remedy is necessary to deter future violations of the unfair trade practice statute or
to foreclose the defendant's retention of any ill-gotten gains."
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pensation for [plaintiff's] future harm is not a fully adequate remedy,"' 0 '
plaintiff may receive specific enforcement of screen credit under theories
other than unfair competition. 102
California case law has authorized injunctive relief for the loss of
screen credit because the legal remedies available to the injured party for
harm resulting from future exhibition of a film without proper attribu-
tion of screen credit are inadequate as a matter of law.'o 3 Three separate
and distinct legal theories support an injunction for screen credit in Cali-
fornia: (1) that an accurate assessment of damages would be far too diffi-
cult and require much speculation; (2) that any future exhibitions might
be deemed to be a continuous breach of contract and thereby create the
danger of a multiplicity of lawsuits; (3) the failure to give credit con-
stitutes irreparable injury, for which damages could not adequately
compensate. "o
Id.
101. Tamarind Lithography Workshop, Inc. v. Sanders, 143 Cal. App. 3d 571, 577, 193
Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (1983).
102. Id. at 575. 193 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
The availability of the remedy of specific performance is premised upon well estab-
lished requisites. These requisites include: a showing by plaintiff of (1) the inade-
quacy of his legal remedy; (2) an underlying contract that is both reasonable and
supported by adequate consideration; (3) the existence of a mutuality of remedies; (4)
contractual terms which are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is
to enforce; and (5) a substantial similarity of the requested performance to that
promised in the contract.
Id.
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) states in pertinent part:
An injunction may be granted in the following cases:
1. When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief de-
manded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continu-
ance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable
injury, to a party to the action;
3. When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in
violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the
action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual;
4. When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief;
5. Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation
which would afford adequate relief;
6. Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings;
7. Where the obligation arises from a trust.
Id.
104. Although not specifically stated by the court in Tamarind, injunctive relief was pre-
sumably authorized by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE (CCPC) § 526(2), (5), (6). CCPC § 526(5)
provides that an injunction may be granted "[w]here it would be extremely difficult to ascer-
tain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief .. " CCPC § 526(6)
provides that an injunction may be granted "[w]here the restraint is necessary to prevent a
multiplicity of judicial proceedings .... CCPC § 526(2) provides that an injunction may be
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2. New York
New York's unfair competition law also provides a basis for injunc-
tive relief. However, early cases displayed a lack of understanding of the
entertainment business. For example, in Loren v. Samuel Bronston Pro-
ductions, Inc. 105 ("Loren") the court failed to perceive the importance of
screen billing.'" 6 In Loren, actress Sophia Loren moved for injunctive
relief to halt the showing of the movie El Cid (Allied Artists 1961) be-
cause she did not receive the billing to which she was entitled by a writ-
ten agreement. 10 Loren was to receive "second (2nd) star billing above
the title, 100% the size and type of the title, on the same line, same size,
same prominence as that used for [co-star] Charlton Heston, who re-
ceived first (1st) star billing."' '° The court denied the actress' request for
an injunction observing that "[tihere is also a genuine question whether,
even if the plaintiff's claims under the billing clause of the ... agreement
are upheld, Miss Loren is really in danger of suffering the loss of prestige
and other damage attributed to its nonobservance."' 0 9
While New York courts had hinted at the potential for injunctive
relief," 0 it was the federal courts, applying New York law, which first
granted "[w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance
of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party
to the action .... "
105. 32 Misc. 2d 602, 224 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
106. Id. at 603, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
The egocentricity which appears to be indigenous to "show business" is here mani-
fested by the passionate insistence of a well known motion picture actress to have her
name emblazoned on Broadway not only in the same type of the same size, but also
on the same line, as that of her male lead. Such vanity - "the frail estate of human
things", a "splendid but destructive egotism," as it has variously been called -
doubtless is due in measurable part to the adulation which the public showers on the
denizens of the entertainment world in a profusion wholly disproportionate to the
intrinsic contribution which they make to the scheme of things when seen in correct
perspective. For that matter often in disproportion to any true talent, latent or
apparent!
Id.
107. Id. at 604, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 603
aft'd, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, affid, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d
80 (1966). Otto Preminger objected to television cuts for Anatomy of a Murder.
The criterion for the determination of what the defendants were likely to do with
respect to interrupting and cutting the subject film, in the absense of a specific con-
tractual arrangement, was not what plaintiffs might disapprove of or dislike but,
rather, what was the normal custom and practice in the industry.
Id. at 371, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603. "Should such 'mutilation' occur in the future, plaintiffs may
make application to this court for injunctive or other relief against such violation as they may
be advised." Id. at 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
[Vol. 10
SCREEN CREDIT
established that a cause of action existed under the state unfair competi-
tion law."' The New York state courts followed suit." 2
3. Damages
Judicial ignorance of the inherent value of screen billing lay at the
root of early cases in California. In these cases, plaintiffs unsuccessfully
attempted to convince courts that credit, even for a commercial flop, had
value within the entertainment community." 13 Smithers v. Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Studios" 4 ("Smithers"), introduced the concept that dam-
ages were recoverable for denial of screen credit despite the fact that the
credit had been denied on a production which was a financial failure." 5
Smithers was hired as an actor on a television series which had poor
ratings." 6  In order to overhaul the show, the producer decided to
change the storyline and the billing of the actors." 7 Though his contract
specified that Smithers was to be billed as the third lead in the series, he
111. National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 747.
Plaintiff also establishes a right to relief under New York law. To prevail under the
common law of unfair competition and General Business Law § 368-d, plaintiff need
not prove more than notice to defendants, which was timely given, and that there
will be dilution of the mark which will have a detrimental effect, particularly in an
area of normal expansion .... In addition, the plaintiff need not prove secondary
meaning.
Id. at 747.
112. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817 (1975).
The defendant's promotional materials offered consumers an opportunity to purchase
"Artie Shaw versions" of Swing Era classics. It is impossible to say, as a matter of
law, that reasonably discriminating consumers would discern that these "versions"
were not authentic Shaw performances, but were instead attempted re-creations by
modern day musicians. We believe that the plaintiff has made a sufficient factual
showing to entitle him to present his case to the jury. A triable issue of fact exists as
to whether reasonably discriminating members of the public would be confused or
misled by defendant's advertising.
Id. at 206-07, 341 N.E.2d at 800-21.
113. See, e.g., Zorich v. Petroff, 152 Cal. App. 2d 806, 811, 313 P.2d 118, 122 (1957).
With respect to the claim of Zorich [plaintiff] that he was entitled to screen credit,
the court impliedly found that he was entitled to credit, but if he has not received it
and does not receive it, he has suffered and will suffer no damage. It is sufficient to
say on this point that there was no evidence from which the court could have placed
a value upon the screen credit to be given plaintiff as an associate producer (Civ.
Code, § 3301.) It is undisputed that no profits have been realized from the picture
and there was apparently a $36,000 deficit. Upon the evidence that was before the
court as to the lack of success of the picture, receipt of screen "credit" by plaintiff
could reasonably have been regarded as a detriment to him.
Id.
114. 189 Cal. Rptr. 20 (App. 1983).
115. Id. at4.
116. Id. at 22.
117. Id. at 22-23.
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was only given credit as the fourth lead.'1 '
In support of his claim, Smithers produced several experts to
demonstrate the direct correlation between credits and future earn-
ings." 9 For example, an agent from the William Morris Agency testified
that credit "is as important as compensation, [that credits] and money go
hand in hand [and that] a lot of times you forego money [for credits]."12
The court finally put to rest the defense argument that "damages arising
from such breach were speculative and incapable of ascertainment."''
In rejecting that contention, the court stated
[o]ne who wilfully breaches the contract bears the risk as to the
uncertainty or the difficulty of computing the amount of dam-
ages .... A number of witnesses established the relationship
between billing and the actor's future negotiation for compen-
sation. The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence
that Smithers suffered an economic loss by reason of MGM's
failure to live up to its agreement. Although witnesses were
unable to estimate with precision how much Smithers had lost
or how much he would earn in future years, the jury was pro-
vided a reasonable basis upon which to calculate damages.' 22
The court found that such a reduction of credit would have serious long
term effects on Smithers' career. 123 Smithers firmly establishes the con-
cept that credit alone has monetary value and removes the onus from
plaintiffs to establish with absolute precision the value of that credit.' 24
118. Id.
119. Smithers, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The judge stated, "the threat was extraneous to the
contract, not only intending to bludgeon Smithers into foregoing his contractual rights but also
threatening action directly affecting the practice of his art and damaging to his future earning
power." Id. at 23.
120. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants Mo-
tion for New Trial at 12-13. The jury awarded Smithers $3.5 million, which included $500,000
for breach of contract, $1 million compensatory damages, and $2 million in punitive damages.
The trial court reduced the jury's punitive award to $1 million, leaving a total recovery of $2.5
million. Order Denying Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Order Deny-
ing Motion for New Trial on Condition Plaintiff Accepts Certain Reduction of Damages (Aug.
21, 1981).
121. Smithers, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
122. Id. (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 23.
124. Id. at 23-24. New York has also recognized the damage remedy for loss of credit, at
least in those cases where "each plaintiff willingly agreed that they would sing the records in
question and that they were not to receive any money for their services .... [T]heir services
were rendered to ... [defendants] in the hope on their part that the professional and commer-
cial exploitation of the records might rebound to their credit in their profession .... " Long v.
Decca Records, 76 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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III. REMOVAL OF CREDIT
The battles are not always over receiving credit. For a variety of
reasons, artists wish to remove their name from a project. 25 A number
of legal theories support the artist in removing the credit, 126 including
invasion of privacy, libel, guild provisions, misrepresentation and the
lack of association of the artist with the enterprise.
A. Invasion of Privacy
1. California
In California, the misappropriation of a person's name or likeness
for commercial advantage is an invasion of privacy.127 This misappropri-
ation permits recovery based on a violation of California Civil Code Sec-
tion 3344. 128 At the minimum, the misappropriation will result in
125. Despite the furor over the colorization of black and white films, no artist has yet at-
tempted to mandate removal of his or her credit from the color version, based on the fact that
the remodeled films were not their work. The author suggests that this approach, utilizing
one of theories discussed in this article, might be more effective than the hysteria which pres-
ently surrounds this issue. See The Colorization of Black and White Films: An Example of the
Lack of Substantive Protection for Art in the United States, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309
(Summer 1988).
126. Presumably, the laws of unfair competition, both federal and state, would apply
equally in cases for removal of credit as they would in denial of credit, since the basic concept
is the same: any misrepresentation of the true origin of the film, whether it pertains to denying
a valid credit or removing a bogus credit, serves to protect the public from a false designation
of the origin of the goods.
This concept of removing a credit to avoid defrauding the public was recognized quite
early, in Paramount Prod. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749
(1937). The dissenting judge recognized "[t]hus it is believed other motion picture producers
will seek to avail themselves of the services of the person given screen credit ... [t]o a person
not reasonably entitled thereto would be a fraud upon the public ...." Id. at 867 (dissenting
opinion).
127. For a privacy case predating the statute, see Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App.
2d 207. A woman's name was put on a very risque publicity letter sent out by the studio. It
was the name of the character in the film. Because she was the only one by that name in the
Los Angeles telephone directory, she was able to recover the damage to her reputation that
such false credit caused. Id. at 209-10.
128. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3 3 44(a) (West Supp. 1989):
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or
services, .. . without such person's prior consent, or in the case of a minor, the prior
consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by
the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any action brought
under this section, the person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured
party or parties in an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars
($750) or the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the unauthorized
use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are
not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing such prof-
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statutory damages. 129 California also considers it actionable to violate a
person's right of publicity, 3 ° or to appropriate one's likeness with a ce-
lebrity look-alike. 3' Such a violation can result in both compensatory
and punitive damages.' 32
Although recognizing the right of privacy, California courts were
reluctant to extend this protection past death. 33 In Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures,134 the court denied protection to Bela Lugosi's persona of
"Dracula" after his death.'3 In response to this decision, the California
legislature responded with an additional statute, California Civil Code
Section 990.136 Section 990 mirrored the language of section 3344, and
extended the privacy theory of credit to deceased persons. 137 Borrowing
from federal copyright law, the legislature adopted a time period of death
plus fifty years for the protection of these rights.
38
its, the injured party or parties are required to present proof only of the gross revenue
attributable to such use, and the person who violated this section is required to prove
his or her deductible expenses. Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured
party or parties. The prevailing party in any action under this section shall also be
entitled to attorney fees and costs.
Id.
129. Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 850, 859, 140 Cal. Rptr. 921, 927 (1977). At
the very least, plaintiff is
entitled to recover nominal damages for breach of contract. We evaluate plaintiffis
right to nominal damages by analogy to Civil Code section 3344, which provides
minimum statutory damages of $300 [now $750] for knowing commercial use of a
person's name or likeness without his consent. The statute's obvious purpose is to
specify an amount for nominal damages in situations where actual damages are im-
possible to assess.
Id.
130. Cher, 692 F.2d at 634.
131. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). "We hold only that when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer [Bette Midler] is widely known and is deliberately
imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have
committed a tort in California." Id. at 463.
132. Clark v. Celeb Publishing, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Punitive dam-
ages predicated on CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294, if guilty of "oppression, fraud, or malice, express
or implied .... Id. at 984.
133. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (Bela Lugosi's
heirs); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959) (Widow of Jesse
James, Jr.).
134. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
135. Id. at 824, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
136. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). See also S. Rodhe, Dracula, Still
Undead, 5 CAL. LAW. 51 (1985).
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). "The rights recognized under
this section are property rights, freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by
means of trust or testamentary document .... Id.
138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(f) (3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
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2. New York
A similar right to removal of credit 3 9 for unauthorized commercial
exploitation of a person's name or likeness exists in New York under
Civil Rights Law Section 51.140 Even before the adoption of section 51,
the New York courts had recognized the right to remove credit for inva-
sion of privacy in those cases in which a person's name is placed on a
work with which he or she had no connection. 4 ' Once the statute was
enacted, it was used to remove credit from works in which the artist did
not play an active role in its creation.
4 2
This right of privacy exists distinct from any contractual relation-
ship between the parties,' 43 and is also separate from the common law
right of publicity."' In New York, the statutory right of privacy does
139. Durgom v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1961). "One who
chooses to portray another, by name or photograph, for trade purposes, runs the risk that the
latter may sue for an injunction and/or damages." Id.
140. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Playgirl used a drawing
which looked like Muhammad Ali. The court found this a violation of Civ. RIGHTS § 51 and
awarded Muhammad Ali an injunction prohibiting further distribution of the magazine. Id.
Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law provides in pertinent part: Any person
whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for ... the purposes of trade
without the written consent [of that person] may maintain an equitable action ...
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injury sustained by reason of such use ....
Id. See also, Jaeger, 330 F. Supp. at 278; Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc.
2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (use of Jackie Onassis' look-alike in advertise-
ment actionable as privacy violation).
141. Eliot v. Jones, 120 N.Y.S. 989, 990 (Sup. Ct. 1910). Dr. Eliot, the former president of
Harvard, consented to the use of his name on a series of books. A rival publisher, without his
consent, pirated Dr. Eliot's name for use on his book series. Id.
142. An author has a right under the New York Civil Rights Law to ensure that any attri-
bution to him accurately reflects his contribution to a manuscript. Gieseking v. Urania
Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 1035, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
"A performer has a property right in his performance that it shall not be used for a
purpose not intended, and particularly in a manner which does not fairly represent
his services." By analogy, it may well be that Follett is entitled to an accurate de-
scription of his role in preparing [the book]. Any rights which he may hold in this
regard are co-extensive with his right under the Lanham Act ....
Follett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 497 F. Supp. 304, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
143. Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968). "The claims based upon Civil Rights Law § 51 and
the Lanham Act present a greater problem. Hendrix himself is entitled to assert a claim for
relief under those acts, irrespective of the contractual dispute between PPX and Yameta." Id.
See also Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 440-41, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012-13 (1st
Dept. 1981). "The wrong consists of only two elements: the commercial use of a person's
name or photograph and the failure to procure the person's written consent for such use." Id.
144. "No social purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay." Zacchini v.
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not extend past death.145 However, the right of publicity does survive
the death of the artist, 4 6 because it is a purely commercial right. 147 The
right of publicity exists post mortem, however, only if it is based on a
commercially valuable image and not on a tarnished image which could
not be perceived to have value. 148 While damages are recoverable for the
violation of the right to publicity, the preferred remedy is an injunc-
tion.149 However, "an author has no right under the Civil Rights law to
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). See also, Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) where the court stated:
[wie think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photo-
graph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and
that such a grant may validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying
transfer of a business or of anything else.
400 F. Supp. at 843. For a further discussion, see Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bembach, Inc.,
58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977), where the court explained that:
In New York there is a distinction between the statutory right which protects living
persons from commercial exploitation of their names and pictures without their writ-
ten consents, as embodied in sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,
and the common-law property right in one's public personality.
Lomardo, 58 A.D.2d 624, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (1977), and see also, Stephano v. News Group
Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580 (1984); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence,
104 A.D.2d 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1984).
145. The right of privacy does not survive death, especially in Al Capone's case, because
"[t]he evil that men do lives after them." Maritote v. Desilu Productions, 345 F.2d 418, at 420
(7th Cir. 1965) (quoting Shakespeare).
146. "In arguing for termination of the right, defendants appear to confuse the two essen-
tially different concepts, that is, the traditional right of privacy which clearly terminates upon
death of the person asserting such a right and the right of publicity which we think does not
terminate on death." Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In a similar case, a company released an unauthorized Elvis Presley poster. ["There is no
reason why the valuable right of publicity - clearly exercised by and financially benefiting
Elvis Presley in life - should not descend at death like any other intangible property right."]
Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). "Similarly, while a cause of action
under the Civil Rights Law is not assignable during one's lifetime and terminates at death, the
right of publicity, i.e., the property right in one's name, photograph and image is under no
such inhibition." Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 624, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
147. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
When determining the scope of the right of publicity, however, one must take into
account the purely commercial nature of the protected right. Courts and commenta-
tors have done just that in recognizing the right of publicity as assignable. There
appears to be no logical reason to terminate this right upon the death of the person
protected.
Id. at 844.
148. Factors, Etc., 444 F. Supp. at 279, 285. Obviously,
any 'right of publicity' died with Al Capone and could not thereafter be invaded.
Furthermore, there could be no valid, surviving claim based on a right of publicity as
this Court construes it. Whatever else Al Capone was doing in life, he was not trying
to create an image with widespread commercial appeal.
Id.
149. Durgom v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752
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restrict the use of his name to indicate his authorship of a work as to
which he possesses no copyright."' 5 ° "The lack of copyright protection
has long been held to permit others to use the names of authors in copy-
ing, publishing or compiling their works."'' In addition, the artist
should be aware that once he has conveyed his artistic work, he forfeits
any right under the privacy law to prohibit the use of his likeness in
connection with it.1
52
B. Libel
The attribution of credit which is not desired by the recipient can be
removed by resort to a cause of action grounded in defamation.' 53 It has
successfully given rise to damages for libel in California.5 4 In New
York, a libel theory has been successfully employed for both general and
(1961). "To deny the injunction sought would permit a clear violation of the Civil Rights Law
and deprive plaintiff of one of the statutory remedies, thus limiting him to the less satisfactory
remedy of a damage suit." Id. at 396, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 754. See also, Brinkley v. Casablancas,
80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981).
The admitted failure of defendant Galaxy to obtain plaintiff's written consent prior to
the unauthorized sale of the poster is, in the circumstances represented herein, dis-
positive on the issue of liability under the Civil Rights Law. Plaintiff is therefore
entitled to summary judgement on the first cause of action, which seeks a permanent
injunction, and to partial summary judgement on liability on the second cause of
action, which seeks compensatory and exemplary damages.
Id. at 441-42, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
150. Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 310.
151. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 71, 80 N.Y.S.2d
575, 577 (1948) (Russian composer's music was in public domain, and they were denied relief
under § 51 to have their credit removed from the titles), af'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430
(1949).
152. Yameta v. Capital Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Jimi Hendrix
could not restrain the use of his likeness under a privacy theory, although he did prevail under
the Lanham Act), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968).
[S]ection 51 also creates a limited exception permitting the use of the name or picture
of an author, composer, or artist in conjunction with artistic productions which have
been "sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection
therewith". We conclude that the exception applies in this case and that the defend-
ant was entitled to summary judgement on the plaintiff's Civil Rights law causes of
action.
Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 205, 341 N.E.2d 817, 819, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394
(1975).
153. Caroll v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
I am of the opinion that these allegations, which are deemed admitted on this mo-
tion, sufficiently plead a claim or cause of action predicated on libel. The asserted
false imputation to plaintiff, a well-known producer, of the production of an inferior
work [that he actually did not produce] that injures his position as a producer in the
professional and theatre world, is libelous per se.
Id. at 96.
154. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). The name of a
fictional character in a film was put in a provocative letter asking men to come and see her, at
an address which was actually the location of a movie theatre. The name used was also that of
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punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.1 55
C. Entertainment Guild Provisions
Through their collective bargaining agreements, the Guilds have in-
stituted specific procedures whereby an artist may remove his or her
credit from a production."5 6
1. Writers
Writers of theatrical screenplays "have the right to have credit given
to him/her on the screen, advertising or otherwise, in a reasonable pseu-
donymous name," '57 but the only ground for refusing credit is servile pay
for their writing.5 8 The television agreement has a similar provision. 59
2. Directors
Film and television directors have the right to remove their credit by
requesting a pseudonym, if the request is approved by the production
company, or by a guild arbitration committee."6 If the director takes his
or her name off the picture "as a condition for using a pseudonym, the
Director must refrain from publicly criticizing the film."''
3. Actors
Unlike writers and directors, removal of credit, or the use of a pseu-
donym, is not a viable remedy for actors, since an actor's likeness is dis-
a real woman, the only one by that name in Los Angeles. She successfully sued under a libel
theory. Id.
155. Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1960) (Editor of
law books was successful under a libel theory in having his name removed from subsequent
editions of which he was not the author, and also received punitive damages); Ben-Oliel v.
Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929) (Libel theory supported removal of
byline from an article which author did not write. It was an inaccurate historical article, and
damaged her professional reputation).
156. See infra notes 159-75 and accompanying text.
157. WGA Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988.
Theatrical Schedule A, 252.
158. Id. A low-paid writer is defined as one receiving less than $125,000 for a feature
length screenplay. Id. Presumably, a writer receiving less than that amount for a script does
not want that fact advertised in the industry, and his agent does not want to have to explain
such a miniscule quote in a subsequent negotiation.
159. WGA Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988.
Television Schedule A, Television Credits, 272. Television writers define low pay as less than
three times applicable minimum. Id.
160. DGA, Basic Agreement of 1987 § 8-211.
161. Id.
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played on the screen."' As a result, the actor's only remedy is a drastic
one: to enjoin the release of a motion picture entirely. In balancing the
possible harm to the actor against the potentially catastrophic repercus-
sions for the production company if the injunction prevented the release
of the movie, it is difficult, though not impossible, for an actor to obtain
this particular remedy. The British comedy group Monty Python was
able to obtain such relief.' 63 The troupe was horrified by the American
Broadcasting Company's ("ABC") editing of their show. The group re-
alized that the public would not be seeing a true representation of their
wit if the edited version was broadcast, and that anything less than the
full, original show would be a fraud on the public. Monty Python in-
voked the protection of the Lanham Act to enjoin the telecast."M The
court rejected ABC's contention that a warning label or disclaimer' 65 at
the top of the show would preserve the comedians' reputation, and
granted the injunction.
166
D. Misattribution of Credit
The artist has a right to remove his credit if he had absolutely
nothing to do with the enterprise with which he is credited.
This is the classic Lanham Act case, since it is obviously a
fraud upon the public not only to deny a credit to a person who
worked upon a production, but the reverse is true, to pass off to
162. It is probably for this reason that the Screen Actors Guild basic agreement has no
provision for the removal of credit.
163. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976).
164. Id. at 25 n.13. See also Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952) (plaintiff
recording artist successfully had his credit removed from his recordings which were altered by
removing eight minutes of music).
165. An alternative to the total removal of credit is the less drastic remedy of placement of a
disclaimer on the property, particularly when the credit attributed to the artist is truthful but
the artist feels it could be misinterpreted.
[T]he court declined to enjoin the selling of an album bearing a current likeness of
plaintiff Charlie Rich, but containing songs just as they had been recorded by Rich
ten to fifteen years before his current success. The court, however, ordered that a
decal be affixed to each album to clarify its contents, thus alleviating any harm that
might be caused by defendant's violation of § 4 3(a) of the Lanham Act.
Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting
CBS, Inc. v. Gusto Records, 403 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)). "Defendant is directed to
affix to the cover of each offending album a label (2) by (3) inches in dimension bearing the
inscription '[t]hese Songs Were Recorded Over Ten Years Ago' in bold letters." CBS, Inc. v.
Springboard Int'l Records, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 563, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Rich v. RCA
Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court could also take appropriate action in
connection with the distribution of further paperbacks and advertising to indicate to the public
and prospective purchasers of the paperback version that changes had been made. Chesler v.
Avon Book Div., 76 Misc. 2d 1048, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552, 557 (1973).
166. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26.
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the public as the product of an artist that with which he had no
connection. 1
67
This rule is especially applicable in those cases where companies attempt
to take commercial advantage of the good will which attaches to a per-
former's personality by hiring a celebrity look-alike.
16
1
Similarly, where an author has written the property which supplies
the underlying rights to the story, a production company cannot change
the title to which the author has agreed to be associated. 169 Conversely,
it is equally damaging when a producer seeks to capitalize on a title al-
ready used by another, 170 because
a vast field of words and phrases is open to a producer who
wishes to seek a title to distinguish his play or photoplay from
that of another. Consequently, whatever doubts there may be
on that score should be resolved in favor of the producer who
has already spent time, money and effort to give the title of his
production a secondary meaning and against the newcomer
who, even unintentionally, uses or simulates the title in such a
manner as to confuse or mislead the public.
171
167. Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 311. See also Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341
N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975) (orchestra leader could obtain relief from misattribution
on common-law passing-off grounds); Zim v. Western Pub. Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978);
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Durgom v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (plaintiffs obtained injunctions
against the use of their names in contexts unrelated to their own activities).
168. See Allen v. National Video, 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Woody Allen was
awarded equitable relief under the Lanham Act to prevent the use of a celebrity look-alike who
portrayed his distinctive "schmiel" trademark. But the court rejected New York Civil Rights
Law § 51 as a legal basis because it was not actually Allen. Id.
169. Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 207 A.D. 311, 202 N.Y.S. 164 (1923).
By its contract with the plaintiff the defendant acquired the right to make a motion
picture based upon the plaintiffs story under the title of "The Iron Rider," and in
connection therewith to advertise the same by the use of the plaintiffs name. The
unauthorized use of plaintiff's name in connection with a story of a different title was
a distinct damage to the plaintiff.
Id. at 314, 202 N.Y.S. at 167.
170. Similarly, the guilds prohibit their members from using the same name. When you
join a guild, if someone already has your name, you must choose another. This led one hopeful
young actor named Jimmy Stewart, upon arriving in Hollywood, to change his name to Stew-
art Granger.
171. Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474
(1947). The court felt
the title "Queen of the Flat Tops" is an arbitrary, fictitious, fanciful, artificial, dis-
tinctive and nondescriptive combination of words .... The title .... being nonde-
scriptive, was a product of the mind. Under [California] Civil Code sections 655 and
980 respondents were the owners of the title and as such owners had the right to its
exclusive use for all purposes. (Civ. Code §§ 654, 679).
Id. at 809, 187 P.2d at 480. Similarly, "[t]he court [found] it impossible to believe that the
selection of the title "Lampoon," out of a universe of possible titles, was fortuitous, in view of
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Neither can former members of rock groups use the group's name if
it would mislead the public.' 72 "Public confusion as- to the source of the
program is inevitable. Plaintiff, therefore, has standing to sue and has
established [his] right to relief under 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(a)."' 73
E. Misrepresentation
Less clear is the situation where the artist did contribute to a work,
but only to a minor degree. The extent of the credit given to the artist
creates the impression that the artist was an integral contributor to the
finished production and now the artist wants to reduce or remove the
credit.174 While primarily a problem of proof, once the artist has estab-
lished that his credit is misleading, courts have reduced the credit.' 75 A
line of cases chronicle the right of artists who have progressed in their
careers to enjoin the release of old productions in which they played mi-
nor roles, which are re-released with advertising which purports to fea-
ture them as a major force in the production.' 76 This theory also
supports removal of credit when the work itself is altered without the
concurrence of the artist. 
77
the negotiations between ABC and National Lampoon." National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at
744.
172. Use of name "Herman's Hermits" by group after Peter Noone had left was actionable
under Lanham Act, since the public believed Noone to be "Herman." Noone v. Banner Talent
Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
173. National Lampoon, 376 F. Supp. at 747.
174. See infra note 178.
175. See infra note 178.
176. Defendant placed plaintiff's name prominently on a record jacket in which he was only
a background player. The court granted an injunction under the Lanham Act, finding that
"[diefendant's misrepresentations can cause irreparable injury to [plaintiff's] professional and
personal reputation." Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). In another case, the Second Circuit awarded damages where defendant
"marketed eight albums purporting to contain feature performances by Jimi Hendrix, but
which either did not contain Hendrix performances at all or contained performances in which
Hendrix was merely a background performer or undifferentiated session player." PPX Enter.
v. Audio Fidelity Enter., 818 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1987). In a third case Ken Follett edited a
book before becoming famous as an author. (Among his credits are "Key to Rebecca," which
was later made into a movie with Cliff Robertson and Robert Culp). Defendant sought to
publish the edited book with plaintiff given credit as principal author. The court prohibited
the publication unless plaintiff's credit was reduced. Follett v. New American Library, Inc.,
497 F. Supp. 304, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In an earlier case, Jimi Hendrix was only background
guitarist, but his picture was featured on the record album cover as if he were the featured
artist. Hendrix was granted an injunction under Lanham Act. Yameta Co. v. Capital
Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 587 rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968).
177. Granz, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952). When eight minutes of music were removed from
a record without permission of plaintiff, he sued to remove his credit. The court stated, "If. ..
the [defendant] did so describe it [as a recording made by plaintiff], he would commit the tort
of unfair competition .... This contractual duty carries by implication, without the necessity
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"The Lanham Act... is designed not only to vindicate 'the author's
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a
distorted form'... but also to protect the public and the artist from mis-
representation of the artist's contribution to a finished work."' 78 Even if
such a custom is a common industry practice, it cannot justify such mis-
representation. 79 In the case of actors, editing can so alter the perform-
ance that it destroys the artistic integrity, a point successfully made by
Monty Python. 1
8 0
Nevertheless, artists must be careful not to contract away their abil-
ity to deny involvement with a program at a later date. This is especially
true when the contract requires the producer to give the artist credit' 8'
for a project on which he or she does not have any contractual right to
control changes, i"2 and with which the artist may disapprove. Because
injunction is an equitable remedy, the plaintiff must insure that his own
conduct does not counter his argument that the credit given him or her is
a misrepresentation of his contribution. 8 3 For example, where a writer
of an express prohibition, the duty not to sell records which make the required legend a false
representation." Id. at 588.
178. Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 313. (quoting Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)).
179. Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 313 ("Even if an attribution of authorship were consistent with
industry practices, it would nevertheless be illegal under the Lanham Act if it misrepresented
the contribution of the person designated as author.").
180. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 19. In issuing a preliminary injunction to prevent broadcast of
their show, the court recognized that
[i]f ABC adversely misrepresented the quality of Monty Python's work, it is likely
that many members of the audience, many of whom, by defendants admission, were
previously unfamiliar with appellants, would not become loyal followers of Monty
Python productions. The subsequent injury to appellants' theatrical reputation
would imperil their ability to attract the large audience necessary to the success of
their venture. Such an injury to professional reputation cannot be measured in mon-
etary terms or recompensed by other relief.
Id.
181. Landon v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Plaintiff
entered into agreement for film version of "Anna and the King of Siam" in 1944. In 1972,
when Fox did a TV series, she brought suit alleging "defamation, invasion of her right of
privacy, misappropriation of literary property and wrongful attribution to Landon of credit for
the series, which she claims to have 'mutilated' her literary property." Id. at 452. The court
found
the claim is insufficient as a matter of law .... Although plaintiff would have a valid
claim against defendants if they had falsely attributed the authorship of the series to
her... her claim must fail, where, as here, she contracted to ... require Fox to give
her appropriate credit "for her contribution to the literary material upon which such
motion pictures shall have been based."
Id. at 459.
182. Id. at 460. "These provisions clearly grant Fox the right to alter the literary property
substantially and to attribute to plaintiff credit appropriate to her contribution." Id.
183. See Market v. Scovill Mfg., 471 F. Supp. 1244, 1255 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
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created a character in a series of books, and then permitted the publisher
to hire other writers to turn out additional books featuring that character
and the author's name, the court denied the writer credit removal."8 4
The court stated:
[plaintiff] who has previously acquiesced to the current descrip-
tion, continues to benefit at the rate of $200,000 a year from the
sale of Harlequin books. While he may not have been guilty of
an 'unconscionable act,' he has been responsible for the re-
peated usage of his name over the years. Under the circum-
stances, he does not have the clean hands required of someone
seeking such equitable relief."85
IV. ENTERTAINMENT GUILD AGREEMENTS
In many cases, an artist, if employed by a signatory to the Guild
agreements, can get a faster and less expensive determination of his credit
rights by an arbitration proceeding conducted by his Guild than he or
she would by pleading his case in state or federal court.18 6 Confusion as
to the appropriate credit for writers can be great. While there is only one
screenplay, numerous writers can make contributions to the finished
script. The Writers Guild of America's ("WGA") arbitration procedure
determines which author's input actually appears in the final screenplay,
and then mandates the credit to appear on the final film print. 187 The
184. Harlequin Enter. v. Warner Books, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Plaintiff
had created a character, "Mack Bolan" in a series of books. Harlequin then hired hack writers
to turn out additional books which used the plaintiff's name. Plaintiff sought to prevent de-
fendant from continuing to list him as author on the books. In denying removal of credit, the
court stated plaintiff,
who has previously acquiesced to the current description, continues to benefit at the
rate of $200,000 a year from the sale of Harlequin books. While he may not have
been guilty of an 'unconscionable act,'. . . he has been responsible for the repeated
usage of his name over the years. Under the circumstances, he does not have the
clean hands required of someone seeking such equitable relief.
Id. at 1081 (citation omitted).
185. Harlequin, 639 F. Supp. at 1091 (citation omitted).
186. See supra notes 159-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the related remedy of
removal of credit and those instances in which guild rules allow the effective removal of the
credit by attributing the service provided on the production to a pseudonym.
187. WGA, Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988.
(Television Schedule A, 285). The WGA agreement provides that
(wihere the Company has failed to provide credit on the screen in accordance with
final credit determination it shall correct each print before such print is re-telecast
and place a full-page advertisement in either Daily Variety or the Hollywood Re-
porter specifically crediting the writer. Such remedies shall be in addition to any
claim the individual writer may have for damages by reason of such failure to pro-
vide credit.
Id. at 285.
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WGA specifically recognizes that guild arbitration is not an exclusive
remedy, since their members can resort to the courts to either obtain
additional relief'88 or invalidate the arbitration. 89 Similarly, the Screen
Actors Guild agreement provides that "[dlisputes as to screen credit
shall be arbitrable."' 9 ° Two concurrent remedies are provided in the
agreement, liquidated damages for past breach1 9' and specific perform-
ance to prevent future breach. 1
92
The Directors' Guild of America takes a "laissez faire" approach to
the enforcement of credit rights, embodying no specific reference to rem-
edies in the guild agreement. In fact, the guild has gone in the opposite
direction and appears to preclude any action by their members to enforce
their right to credit by injunction. 93 This guild provision has never been
tested in court, but might be found in violation of public policy. Unfair
competition under the Lanham Act or parallel state statutes could argua-
bly be employed regardless of guild agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
The law of screen credit has made rapid advances in the last several
decades. Initially, the courts took a position rooted in ignorance of the
economics of the entertainment business, holding that screen credit had
no intrinsic value and that the denial of such credit did not give rise to
188. WGA, Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988.
Article 12: Court Proceedings.
Nothing in this Basic Agreement shall limit the rights of the Guild or any writer to
assert any and all appropriate legal and equitable rights and remedies to which the
Guild or such writer is entitled in courts of competent jurisdiction with regard to an
alleged breach of Article 8 and Schedule A of this Basic Agreement with respect to
writing credit ....
Id.
189. WGA, Theatrical and Television, Basic Agreement of 1988, effective Aug. 8, 1988.
"Nothing in this Basic Agreement shall preclude any court of competent jurisdiction from
confirming, setting aside or modifying any grievance or arbitration award hereunder in any
proceeding brought for such purpose in accordance with applicable law." Id.
190. 1977 SAG Television Agreement 51, § 54, Screen Credit and Billing (b) (3), and 1977
SAG Theatrical Agreement 31, § 25, Screen Credits (C) (3).
191. 1977 SAG Television Agreement 5 1, § 54, Screen Credit and Billing (b) (5), and 1977
SAG Theatrical Agreement 3 1, § 25, Screen Credits (C) (5). Liquidated damages are awarded
"if a breach occurs and the facts are not in dispute, or if breach is found by an arbitrator."
192. 1977 SAG Television Agreement 51, § 54, Screen Credit and Billing (b) (7), and 1977
SAG Theatrical Agreement 31, § 25, Screen Credits (C) (7). Specific performance consists of
"[c]orrection of prints with respect to the first broadcast or first rerun [which] may be awarded
by the arbitrator ...." Id.
193. DGA, Basic Agreement of 1984, § 8-101. "In no event shall an Employer be obligated
to delay the preparation or issuance of advertising matter or the release of any motion picture
pending proceedings for the determination of credits." Id.
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damages nor mandate an injunction to prevent its continued denial.' 94
From that starting point, the courts became increasingly sophisticated
about the realities of the marketplace, and thus increased the remedies
available to the aggrieved artist. In recognizing that the credit itself has
monetary value, and that the denial of screen credit is an appropriate
basis for enjoining exhibition of the property, the courts have developed a
policy which arms the artist with significant protections. Studios, net-
works, and production companies should think twice before violating
artists' right to screen credit.
194. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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